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ASSAULT ON HATCH ACT
SIGNALS POLITICAL ACTIVITY
FOR GOVERNMENT WORKERS
Since the Supreme Court's 1947 decision in United Public Workers
v. Mitchell,1 it has been virtually unquestioned that Congress is constitutionally authorized to control the political conduct of government
workers and, more particularly, that the Political Activities Act of
19392 (commonly known as the Hatch Act) represents a proper exercise of that authority. Unlike other constitutional precedents, and
strikingly unlike most first amendment cases, Mitchell has apparently
been considered relatively unassailable - until recently. In December,
the Supreme Court agreed to hear arguments on an appeal from a
three-judge court decision that has signaled the most drastic potential
changes in political freedoms for government workers since the passage
of the Civil Service Act of 1883.3 In National Association of Letter
Carriers, AFL-CIO v. United States Civil Service Commission,4 a
District Court for the District of Columbia panel found the key

section of the Hatch Act "unacceptable under the First Amendment."5'
1 330 U.S. 75.
2 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501-08, 7321-27 (1970).
3 The Civil Service Act of 1883 made the Civil Service Commission responsible for
administering the merit system for federal employees. The Act attempted to curtail the
"spoils" system which had traditionally caused post-election replacements of government
employees by those who supported the most recently victorious political party. The assassination of President John Garfield in 1881 by a disappointed office seeker is generally
credited with having led to the downfall of the spoils system. See generally C. Fisil, THE
CML SERVICE AND THE PATRONAGE (1904).
The Civil Service Act forbade specified conduct relating to the making of political
contributions by government employees. It also prohibited the use of official authority
to coerce the political action of any person. 22 Stat. 403 (1883), as amended, 5 U.S.C.
§ 3301 et seq. (1970).
4 346 F. Supp. 578 (D.D.C. 1972), appeal filed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3241 (U.S. Oct. 24, 1972)
(No. 72-634), review granted, 41 U.S.L.W. 324 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1972). The Court has also
granted review in an appeal from another three-judge court opinion that upheld the
constitutionality of Oklahoma's "little Hatch Act." Broadrick v. Oklahoma ex rel. Okla.
Personnel Bd., 38 F. Supp. 711 (W.D. Okla. 1972) (mem.), review granted, 41 U.S.L.W.
3324 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1972) (No. 71-1639). Thus, it appears that the Supreme Court will
rule on the first amendment validity of state "Hatch Acts" at the same time it decides
what limits may constitutionally be placed on the political activities of federal employees.
See note 84 infra.
5 346 F. Supp. at 584. The action was brought by the National Association of Letter
Carriers and six federal employees who sought a judgment declaring 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2)
(1970), unconstitutional. The section reads as follows:
(a) An employee in an Executive agency or an individual employed by the
government of the District of Columbia may not(2) take an active part in political management or in political campaigns.
For the purpose of this subsection, the phrase "an active part in political management or political campaigns" means those acts of political management or
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Although the court strongly endorsed the congressional goal of curbing
"'pernicious" political activity on the part of government employees,
it nevertheless struck down the provision that prohibits federal employees6 from taking "an active part in political management or in
political campaigns." 7 The section was found to have a "'chilling
effect'" on freedom of speech and association due to the "vice of overbreadth and attendant vagueness."
The policy considerations articulated in restrictions on the political
activities of government workers have had a long history in this country.
In 1801, Thomas Jefferson warned that it was "improper" for officers
of the executive to "attempt to control or influence the free exercise
of the elective right."9 Though presidential concern for a neutral civil
service was reiterated in 1841,10 1877,11 and 1886,12 it was not until
1907 that President Theodore Roosevelt, a former Civil Service commissioner, prohibited employees in the competitive classified service
political campaigning which were prohibited on the part of employees in the
competitive service before July 19, 1940, by determinations of the Civil Service
Commission under rules prescribed by the President.
It is important to note at the outset of this discussion that the current dispute does
not involve the provision of the Hatch Act that prohibits an employee from using "his
official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with or affecting the result
of an election." 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(1) (1970). The Hatch Act itself contains a number of
other sections and there are also other statutes that regulate the political conduct of
government employees. See note 123 infra.
6 The Act's prohibitions exclude only those federal employees paid by the office of the
President, heads or assistant heads of executive or military departments, and presidential
appointees whose nominations are advised and consented to by the Senate. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7324(d) (1970).
The individual plaintiffs in Letter Carriers are all employees whose positions fall
under the control of the Civil Service Commission although they vary in administrative
responsibility. The six plaintiffs hold the following positions: executive officer in the
Internal Revenue Service, systems analyst for the National Library of Medicine, director
in the political and legal analysis branch of the National Center for Health Services
Research and Development of the Department of Health, assistant regional field director
of the National Association of Letter Carriers, letter carrier and member of the National
Association of Letter Carriers.
75 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2) (1970).
8 346 F. Supp. at 584.
9 10 J. RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PREsiDENTs 98 (1899). In England, a
1710 statute provided a fine and dismissal for any post office employee who attempted to
influence another person's vote. 9 Anne, c. 10, § 44 (1710). For a discussion of English
prohibitions today, see text accompanying notes 117 and 118 infra.
10 In 1841, President John Tyler had his Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, issue
an order restricting political activity by federal employees. 4 J. RICHARDSON, MESSAGES
AND PAPERs oF THE PRESIDENTS 52

(1899).

11 In 1877, President Rutherford Hayes ordered a restriction of political activities
by and political assessments against federal employees. 7 id. at 450-451.
12 In 18$6, three years after the passage of the Civil Service Act, President Grover
Cleveland issued yet another executive order restricting political activities by federal
office holders. 8 id. at 494.
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from taking an active part in political activity. 13 Roosevelt's executive

order did not interfere with an employee's rights to vote as he pleased
and to express privately his views on political subjects. 14 Civil Service
Rule I, which incorporated Roosevelt's executive order, remained in
effect until the Hatch Act was passed. 15
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

In 1937, Senator Carl Hatch introduced an amendment to the

1938 Works Progress (later Work Projects) Administration (WPA)
appropriations bill that would have prevented federal employees in
administrative capacities from using their influence to interfere with
elections or primaries. This effort to apply to the WPA the same
restrictions as were then imposed on competitive employees by the

Civil Service Commission failed to pass a Senate vote. 16 Following the
amendment's defeat, a special committee was formed under the chair-

manship of Senator Morris Sheppard to investigate the use of relief
and relief-work funds' 7 for political ends. Public indignation concerning the reported misuse of funds during the 1938 Kentucky

Democratic primary added to apprehension about the rapid expansion
of government employee rosters that accompanied New Deal pro18
grams.
13 Exec. Order No. 642 (June 3, 1907). Roosevelt's executive order, which later became
Civil Service Rule I (and also the basic wording of the Hatch Act's political activity
section), did not specifically define the acts prohibited. It is dear, however, that Roosevelt's restrictions were more severe than the provisions of the Hatch Act in that employees
could express their political views only in private. During the years before the Hatch Act
was passed, the Civil Service Commission handed down some 3,000 determinations under
Rule I which the Hatch Act later incorporated as its definition of prohibited activities.
See note 5 supra.
14 Id. See generally THEODORE ROOsEvET, AN AUTOBrOGRAPHY, ch. V (1918).
15 The only significant difference between the Hatch Act and Rule I is that, under
the Act, employees are permitted, in most instances, to publicly express their views on
political subjects.
1683 CONG. lRE. 5569, 7999-8000 (1938).
17During the years following President Franklin Roosevelt's inauguration, many
non-merit employees were added to the federal work rolls under relief-work programs to
combat the Depression. By 1939, 40 per cent of federal workers were not regulated by
the merit system. P. VAN RIPER, HisroRy OF TiE U.S. CwvIL SERvicE 340 (1958).
18 COMMISSION ON POLITICAL AmarvTy OF GOVFRaNMrENT PERSONNEL, FINDINGS AND Rtc-

oMMENDATIONS, VOL. 1, at 9 (1967) [hereinafter CoMirssIoN ON POLITICAL Acrivrry]. The
1938 Kentucky Democratic primary included a race between Governor "Happy" Chandler
and Alben Barkley for the senatorial nomination. That contest gave rise to widespread
reports of political corruption. Large numbers of WPA workers were said to be working
for Barkley as well as being pressured to vote for him. State workers, on the other hand,
were reported to have been assessed percentages of their salaries to aid Chandler's efforts
in addition to being pressured to vote and work for his election. N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1938,
at 10, col. 3.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:509

The Sheppard Committee, the only fact-finding effort to precede
passage of the Hatch Act, determined that funds appropriated for
relief programs had been diverted to political activities. 19 However,
none of the 16 Sheppard Committee recommendations suggested prohibiting voluntary political activity. Shortly after the Sheppard Report
was presented, Senator Hatch introduced his bill which became law
several months later.
In passing the Hatch Act, Congress extended prohibitions concerning political activity to non-competitive Civil Service employees
of the federal government as well as to certain state and local employees.2 0 Until 1966, violations of the Act's prohibitions were punished
by mandatory removal of an offending employee from his job. 21
The goals of the Hatch Act have been summarized as follows:
(I) preventing the party in power from making political demands of
employees designed to ensure that party's continuation in power;
(2) alleviating the danger of government workers organizing into a
self-seeking political force; (3) ensuring continuity of efficient administration when department heads change by eliminating the distrust that might arise from political differences; and (4) preventing the
demoralization of employees that would result from political com22
petition for promotions.
Though most authorities recognize the wisdom of the Act's goals,
many take issue with its sweep. As presently written, the Act's prohibitions apply to approximately three million federal employees.23 Some
critics would limit prohibitions to coerced political activity and thus
allow workers to voluntarily engage in political activity.24 Other critics
IDS. REP'. No. 1, 76th Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1989).
205 U.S.C. §§ 1502-07 (1970) applies Hatch Act restrictions to state and local officers
or employees whose "principal employment is in connection with an activity which is
financed in whole or in part by loans or grants made by the United States or Federal
agency...." Id. § 1501(4). The issues involved in those provisions of the Act that cover
state and local employees are essentially the same as the federal restrictions and, as Letter
Carriersdid not grant standing to consider those issues, they will not be treated separately
in this article.
21Today the Civil Service Commission can impose less severe penalties if the Commission members unanimously agree that the violation does not warrant removal. 5

U.S.C. § 7325 (1970).
22Esman, The Hatch Act-A Reappraisal, 60 YALE LJ. 986, 994-95 (1951). For a
pre-Hatch Act discussion of the evils inhering in a permissive policy regarding partisan
political activity by public employees, see Catherwood, Political Activity by Civil Service
Employees, 7 ILL. L. Rav. 160 (1912).
23 U.S. BuREAu OF FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC COMMERCE, DEPT. oF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
AESTRAar OF THE U.S. at 888 (1971).
24 Provisions of the Hatch Act other than those at issue in Letter Carriers provide
safeguards against coercion of employees for political purposes and solicitation of funds
for the same purposes. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321-23 (1970). Thus, even if the Supreme Court should
affirm the three-judge court opinion, these strictures would remain in effect.
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would limit application of the Act to administrative employees and
lift restrictions on industrial-type workers. 25 Still others note vagueness
and contradictions in the Act's provisions and would spell out the
specific activities intended to be prohibited. This problem of vagueness
was the basis of the court's decision in Letter Carriers.
In considering the Hatch Act, Congress debated the issue of definition as well as the question whether the prohibitions should extend
to voluntary activity.26 The possibility of granting the Civil Service
Commission authority to promulgate rules and regulations defining
prohibited activity and the alternative possibility of spelling out restrictions were both considered but Congress opted for neither, deciding
instead to incorporate the Commission's earlier rulings as to acts prohibited under Civil Service Rule I.2 By limiting the reach of the Act
to Rule I decisions promulgated by the Commission between 1907
and 1940, Congress hoped to achieve precision of definition while
withholding a broad delegation of authority from the Commission. 2
When he introduced the compromise proposal of incorporating
the prior rulings, Senator Hatch asserted that interpretations of activities prohibited by the Act would be strictly limited to those
decisions. 29 This substitute definition by incorporation was adopted
by the Senate on the same day it was proposed by Senator Hatch
despite the fact that, according to one commentator, a responsible
investigation of the substance of the rulings would have precluded
adoption of every one of the 3,000 pre-1940 decisions.30 Some of those
rulings led to disciplinary action where an employee engaged in one
of the following activities: making a wager on an election; wearing a
political button while on duty; denouncing a political party while
in a jovial mood due to alcohol; failing to discourage a spouse's political
participation; disparaging the President.31
There is evidence that members of Congress were uncertain as
to whether they were incorporating all of the rulings issued under
Rule I or merely the incomplete summaries which the Commission
25 See text accompanying note 117 infra.
26 86 CONG. REc. 2920-63 (1940).
27 S. REP. No. 1236, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 4 (1940).
28 Some Senators felt that to authorize the Commission

to define the prohibited activities would be equivalent to granting it legislative power. 86 CONG. REc. 2928 (1940).
29 Circuit Judge MacKinnon's dissent in Letter Carriers views the incorporated definition as a set of "outer limits" within which Congress intended the Civil Service Commission to define prohibited acts in the future. 346 F. Supp. at 593. See text accompanying
note 101 infra.
30 Rose, A CriticalLook at the Hatch Act, 75 HAtv. L. Ray. 510, 515 (1962).
31346

F. Supp. at 581.
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published at irregular intervals under the designation "Form 1236."' 2
Senator Hatch circulated a post card-size summary of 18 categories of
interpretations of Rule I.3 Although some senators protested incorporation of decisions not before the Senate, the majority leader, Senator
Alben Barkley, argued that individual consideration of each Commission interpretation would unnecessarily delay a vote.3 One writer
has stated that no member of Congress, not even Senator Hatch, read
35
the actual rulings which the Act incorporated by reference.
Mitchell
In United Public Workers v. Mitchell,36 the Supreme Court decided, by a 4-3 vote, that application of the Hatch Act's prohibitions
and penalty clause to the political activities of the single plaintiff
granted standing to challenge the Act was constitutional.3 7 The action
which sought to enjoin enforcement of the Act's prohibitions against
employees taking an active part in political management and campaigns
was instituted by 11 federal employees and the United Public Workers
of America. Plaintiffs also asked that the provisions in question be
declared unconstitutional. 38
The Court first addressed itself to the standing problem, holding
that George Poole, an industrial worker in the Philadelphia mint, was
the only plaintiff having the requisite interest in the constitutionality
of the Act to institute the litigation. Poole had already been charged
32 PoLmcA-L ACTVITY AND PoLIncAL ASSESSMENTS OF FEDERAL OFFICEHOLDERS AND EM-

PLOYEES, Form 1236, U.S. Civil Service Commission (1939)..
33 Some of the interpretations printed on the card prohibited participation in state,
county and municipal, as well as national, politics; involvement as a delegate, alternate
or proxy at a political convention; organization of political rallies; political speechmaking; solicitation of votes; publication of material in, or in connection with, political
newspapers; placement of wagers on election results; distribution of campaign literature.
86 CONG. REc. 2943 (1940).
34 86 CoNG. REQ. 2949 (1940).
35 Rose, A Critical Look at the Hatch Act, 75 HAtv. L. REv. 510, 514 n.18. Professor
Rose cites a letter which he received from former Senator Hatch in 1960. The letter
reportedly stated that the ex-Senator had no recollection that a study of the rulings had
been made.
36 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
37 Although the Mitchell decision has been widely relied upon as authority for the
proposition that the Hatch Act is constitutional in toto, the very narrow factual context
in which the legislation was examined makes such reliance questionable. See text accompanying note 40 infra. The fact that Justices Murphy and Jackson took no part in
the decision makes it clear that the 4-3 opinion was in fact a minority decision.
38 Though labor unions are united in their support of the Letter Carrier's union
today, in 1947 the United Public Workers organization received only limited support for
its efforts from the National Federation of Federal Employees and the American Federation of Federal Employees. Epstein, Political Sterilization of Civil Servants: The United
States and Great Britain, 10 PuB. ADMIN. REv. 281, 287 (1950) [hereinafter Epstein]. See
text accompanying note 130 infra.
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with committing prohibited political acts and an order for his dismissal
had been adopted. 39 As a ward executive committeeman of a political
party, he was active at election polls and was a paymaster for the
services of other political workers.
Although the Court recognized that the Hatch Act interfered
with what would otherwise be rights guaranteed by the first, ninth
and tenth amendments, it narrowed its deliberations to the question
whether "such a breach of the Hatch Act [Poole's activities] . . .can,

without violating the Constitution, be made the basis for disciplinary
action." 40 It concluded that such sanctions were indeed constitutional.
Relying on the separation of powers doctrine, the court endorsed
Congress's authority to regulate the conduct of government employees
"within reasonable limits." Justice Reed wrote for the majority:
When actions of civil servants in the judgment of Congress
menace the integrity and competency of the service, legislation to
forestall such danger and adequate to maintain its usefulness is
required. The Hatch Act is the answer of Congress to this need.
We cannot say with
such a background that these restrictions are
41
unconstitutional.
The majority found support for its decision in Ex parte Curtis,42 a
decision in which the Court had earlier affirmed Congress's power to
regulate the political conduct of goverment workers. Curtis upheld the
conviction of a federal employee for violating a statute that prohibited
government employees from soliciting or receiving money for political
purposes from each other. The decision noted the existence of a legislative right to "maintain proper discipline in the public service. Clearly
such a provision is within the just scope of legislative power. .. .
Justice Bradley, dissenting in Curtis, argued, however, that the statute
went too far in combating the limited evil of "political assessments."44
He reasoned that Congress could not condition employment on a
requirement that a citizen surrender the fundamental right to promote
45
his views on public affairs.

The Mitchell Court followed the Curtis majority in recognizing
such a legislative prerogative to condition employment on the relinquishment of first amendment rights and cited a declaration made by Judge
39 330 U.S. at 91-92.
40 Id. at 94.

41 Id. at 103.
42 106 U.S. 371
43 Id. at 373.
44 Id. at 578.

45 Id.

(1882).
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(later Justice) Holmes as he declined to overturn the removal of a
policeman for political activity: "'The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right
to be a policeman.'46
Mitchell also relied on the Court's earlier decision in United
States v. Wurzbach47 where the doctrine of legislative power over
government officials was held valid as applied to members of Congress
itself. In Wurzbach, the defendant was convicted under the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 on charges that he received sums of money
from government employees for his own political purposes while a
member of Congress.
Justice Black, dissenting, protested the majority's reliance on
Curtis and Wurzbach. He argued that both cases related to statutes
"which did no more than limit the right of employees to collect money
from other employees.

48

Though the Mitchell majority rested on Congress's right to reasonably regulate government employee conduct and disclaimed any
need "to examine . . .further at this time into the validity of the

[Act's] definition of political activity," 49 Justice Black refused to restict
his examination to Poole's transgressions and condemned the definition
as "too broad, ambiguous, and uncertain."5 0
[L]aws which restrict the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment should be narrowly drawn to meet the evil aimed at and to
affect only the minimum number of people imperatively necessary
to prevent a grave and imminent danger to the public. 51
Justice Douglas's dissenting opinion called for a distinction between restrictions imposed on administrative workers and those applied
to industrial workers. "Poole," he asserted,

"...

is as remote from con-

tact with the public or from policy making or from the functioning of
the administrative process as a charwoman. ' 52 Since the specific evils
which a "spoils" system might impose on industrial workers could be
dealt with by more narrowly drawn legislation,58 Justice Douglas saw
no need to politically sterilize the industrial group.
46 330 U.S. at 99 n.34, quoting McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29
N.E. 517, 517 (1892).
47280 U.S. 396 (1930).
48330 U.S. at 112 (Black, J., dissenting in part).
49 Id. at 103-04 (emphasis added).
5IOld, at 110 (Black, J., dissenting in part).
51Id.
52

Id. at 122 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). See generally 15 GEo. WAs.

443 (1947).
53830 U.S. at 123 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
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The Mitchell decision has been criticized as a "dangerous step"5 4
toward the abrogation of fundamental rights. In focusing on the separation of powers doctrine, the Court disregarded an observation it had
previously made concerning first amendment rights:
In every case, therefore, where legislative abridgment of the
rights is asserted, the courts should be astute to examine the effect
of the challenged legislation. Mere legislative preferences or beliefs
respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to
justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.5 5
Mitchell's divergence from prior first amendment doctrine indicates
that the Court relied heavily on the factual context of Poole's activity
and the special nature of public employment.
Mitchell is still law and will remain so at least until the Supreme
Court rules on the Letter Carriers appeal." How the Court will act
this term to dispose of the constitutional issues posed by the Hatch Act
can best be predicted by examining decisions subsequent to Mitchell
and by noting changes in the political and merit systems since 1947.
Perusal of a series of first amendment opinions issued during the sixties
and reviewed and summarized in the 1972 case, Grayned v. City of
Rockford,57 compels one to conclude that the Court will be unable to
avoid inquiring into the validity of the Hatch Act on the basis of the
doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth. 5 The Grayned opinion de54 Mosher, Government Employees Under the Hatch Act, 22 N.Y.U.L.Q. REy. 233,

253 (1947).

55 Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939). Schneider struck down municipal ordinances that forbade distribution of leaflets on public streets as violative of the first amendment freedoms of speech and press. In Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945), the Court
had said:
The rational connection between the remedy provided and the evil to be curbed,
which in other contexts might support legislation against attack on due process
grounds, will not suffice. These rights rest on firmer foundation. Accordingly,
whatever occasion would restrain orderly discussion and persuasion, at appropriate time and place, must have clear support in public danger, actual or impending. Only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion
for permissible legislation.
Id. at 530.
56 The Letter Carriersinjunction against enforcement of the disputed sections of the
Hatch Act was coupled with a stay of the order pending a determination by the Supreme
Court. 346 F. Supp. at 585.
57408 U.S. 104 (1972). Grayned reviewed the conviction of a defendant who had
violated two Rockford, Illinois, ordinances, one prohibiting picketing near a school and
the other prohibiting willful noise and disturbances near a school. The Court reversed
the anti-picketing conviction and struck down that ordinance as violative of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 107. However, the Court upheld
the anti-noise conviction, concluding that the second ordinance was not violative of the
doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth. Id. at 108.
58 See generally Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HAsv. L. REv.
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dared, "It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is
void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined." 59
The Court has stated three reasons for its void-for-vagueness
doctrine: (1) laws must give a person of ordinary intelligence an
opportunity to know what he may and may not do within the law;
(2) laws must be explicit in order to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement; and (3) vague laws that relate to first amendment
rights tend to inhibit the exercise of those rights since persons affected
conduct themselves with greater restraint than would be required by
clearly drawn laws.6 0 Overbreadth, on the other hand, may occur
even in precisely drawn legislation "if in its reach it prohibits constitutionally protected conduct." 6' An overbroad law is one that "sweeps
within its prohibitions what may not be punished under the First
62
and Fourteenth Amendments."
RECENT FIRST AMENDMENT DECISIONS

In Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction,63 the Court struck down
as unconstitutionally vague a Florida statute that required every employee of the state and its subdivisions to execute, under penalty of
dismissal, a written oath that he had never lent his support or influence
to the Communist Party.64 The Court criticized the statute for failing
to "objectively" define the terms "influence" and "support. 6 5 Although
the Hatch Act's definition by incorporation of prohibited activities
can be "objectively" determined, such determination requires study of
some 3,000 pre-1940 rulings of the Civil Service Commission. The
interpretations of those rulings as published by the Commission 66 does
not have legislative authority and is, therefore, an unreliable list. Confusion on the part of many employeesT illustrates the fact that the
definition has not been dearly understood.
The Cramp opinion also concluded that the issue of whether
there exists a right to public employment, as opposed to the notion of
844 (1970); Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. OF PA.
L. R v. 67 (1960).
59 408 U.S. at 108.
60 Id. at 108-09.
611d. at 114.
62 Id. at 115.
638368 U.S. 278 (1961). See also Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 860 (1964).
64368 U.S. at 288.
65 Id. at 287.
66 5 CXF.R. § 733 (1972). In 1971 the Commission issued a three-volume compilation
of its rulings under Civil Service Rule I from 1886 to 1940. UNrrED STATES CiviL SERVICE
POLITICAL AcTryVT REPORTER (1971).
67 See text accompanying notes 113 and 114 infra.
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public employment as a privilege, would not be a factor determinative
of the first amendment question.68 By so concluding, the Court added
to a series of opinions6 9 which have repudiated the so-called "rightprivilege" distinction on which the Mitchell majority relied.70 Absent
clear justification, public employment, particularly in view of the soaring number of employees since Justice Holmes' declaration, 71 can
no longer be conditioned on relinquishment of constitutional rights.
The Court struck down another oath requirement in Elfbrandt v.
Russell.72 Arizona public employees were required to declare that
they would not become members of any organization which had as one
of its purposes the overthrow of the government. Elfbrandt was based
on the "cherished freedom of association" 73 and declared the oath
unconstitutionally overbroad because those who join an organization
but do not share its unlawful goals pose no threat.7 4 Although the
Hatch Act does not prohibit membership in political organizations,
it does restrict certain activities in those organizations. Elfbrandt appears clearly applicable to the Letter Carrierssituation in that it may
cogently be argued that, if freedom of association is to be meaningful,
employees who join political organizations must be permitted to take
part in the activities of those organizations.7 5
In Sherbert v. Verner,76 the Court held that South Carolina
could not constitutionally apply eligibility provisions of an unemployment compensation statute so as to deny benefits to a claimant who had
refused employment because her religion prohibited working on Saturday. The Court declared that it was incumbent upon the state "to
68 368 U.S. at 288.
69 See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); Slochower v. Bd. of Higher Educ., 350
U.S. 551 (1956); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). In Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), the Court reversed the dismissal of an Illinois school teacher

for sending a letter to a newspaper which was critical of the school board's revenue raising
program. The Court said:
To the extent that the Illinois Supreme Court's opinion may be read to suggest
that teachers may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of
public interest in connection with the operation of the public schools in which
they work, it proceeds on a premise that has been unequivocally rejected in
numerous prior decisions of this Court.
Id. at 568.
70 See text accompanying note 46 supra.
71 Id.
72 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
73 Id. at 18.

74 Id. at 17. See also United States v. Robel, 889 U.S. 258 (1967); note 83 infra.
75 A federal employee is permitted to be a member of a political party and to attend
conventions and rallies but he may not serve as an officer of a political party or of a local
committee of a political party, actively engage in fund-raising, or take an active part in
the management of a political campaign. 5 C.F.R. §§ 733.111, 733.122 (1972).
76 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would combat such
abuses without infringing First Amendment rights." 77 In the current
Letter Carriersdispute, the government should be required, therefore,
to show that legislation less sweeping than the Hatch Act is not a
feasible alternative.78
Keyishian v. Board of Regents79 held unconstitutionally vague a
New York statute which made "treasonable" or "seditious" words or
acts grounds for removal from the public school system. The Court
noted the potential effect of the "obscure wording" on those who would
scrupulously undertake to apply it. 0 Although New York's goal of protecting its educational system from subversion was recognized as legitimate, the statute's "chilling effect" upon the exercise of vital first
8
amendment rights was condemned. .
Keyishian did much to clarify the Court's void-for-vagueness
doctrine, indicating that it is not only a principle that regulates the
permissible relationship between written law and the potential offender
but is also as an instrument that mediates between the potential for
coercion by government bodies and the government's duty to protect
the individual's interests.8 2 The Court has also clearly condemned over-

breadth in statutory language, particularly where the threat of sanctions may deter the exercise of first amendment rights:
Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to sur-

vive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity.83
77 Id. at 407. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, decided in the same year as Sherbert,
made it clear that the same standard applies to freedom of speech and association cases.
There, the Court ruled that "only a compelling state interest in the regulation of a
subject ... can justify limiting First Amendment freedoms" and that "precision of regulation must be a touchstone" when such regulations are promulgated. Id. at 438.
78 The overbreadth doctrine might be used to limit political activity prohibitions to
certain categories of government employees. The Hatch Act may be deemed overbroad
in that it (1) applies to activities that may not constitutionally be prohibited and (2)
restricts classes of employees whose activities may not validly be restricted as well as
classes of employees whose activities may validly be restricted. See text accompanying
notes 52 and 53 supra.
79 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
80 Id. at 599. The Court undoubtedly feared the use of obscure regulations to punish
and threaten individuals whose activities, if spelled out in the statute, could not legitimately be made a basis for disciplinary action.
81 rd. at 604.
82 Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. RLy.
67, 81 (1960).
83 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). See also Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104 (1972); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940). In United States v.
Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967), the Court held that a section of the Subversive Activities
Control Act making it unlawful for a member of a Communist action organization to
engage in any employment in any defense facility was unconstitutional in that it sought
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In scrutinizing the Hatch Act, the Supreme Court will find it
necessary to deal not only with the opinions of the last decade which
subject legislation to strict first amendment scrutiny but also with decisions (other than Letter Carriers itself) which have held Mitchell
to be less than binding.8 4 Last year, the District Court for the District
of Rhode Island, in Mancuso v. Taft,8 5 supported a policeman's right
to be a candidate for nomination to the state General Assembly and
deemed unconstitutional city charter provisions that prohibited public
employees from participating in political activities. "[I]t appears that
the facts of Mitchell's world are not the facts of life today,""6 the court
wrote.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently declared that the
Mitchell standard of review, "with its almost wholesale deference to
the legislature's judgment,"87 was
a broad prophylactic rule against political activity - which, in the
individual case, might proscribe conduct unrelated to a significant
to bar employment both for those types of association that may be proscribed and those
types of association that may not be made the subject of sanction consistently with first
amendment rights. Id. at 266.
84 In addition to courts which have specifically criticized Mitchell, two state courts

have ruled that so-called "Little Hatch Acts," which apply to state and local agency
employees, are unconstitutional.
Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital District, 65 Cal.2d 499, 421 P.2d 409, 55
Cal. Rptr. 401 (1966), held that a statute that prohibited government employees from
taking part in campaigns for or against any candidate of their political sub-division or
ballot measure was overbroad. The Supreme Court of California noted that more specific legislation could be drafted to prohibit an employee from campaigning against his
superior.
The Supreme Court of Arizona, in Huerta v. Flood, 103 Ariz. 608, 447 P.2d 866
(1968), struck down a statute which provided that no government employee could ask
another employee to contribute anything of value to any organization for political purposes. The court approved the aim of curbing corrupt practices in politics but reasoned
that the vague language of the statute might cause employees to refrain from activity not
prohibited.
The Supreme Court has recently granted review of a three-judge district court opinion which, contrary to these earlier decisions, upheld the validity of an Oklahoma statute
which prohibits state employees from taking part in the management or affairs of any
political party or campaign. Broadrick v. Oklahoma ex rel. Okla. Personnel Bd., 338
F. Supp. 711 (W.D. Okla. 1972) (mem.), review granted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3324 (U.S. Dec. 11,
1972) (No. 71-1639). The district court panel was dearly influenced by the notion that an
"inferior court can never 'erode' a decision of the United States Supreme Court [Mitchell]."
Id. at 716. It is interesting to note that the memorandum opinion of the Oklahoma district court, with its assumption of the applicability and continuing validity of Mitchell,
is in marked contrast to the approach taken in Letter Carriers.
85841 F. Supp. 574 (D.R.I. 1972).
86 Id. at 576. The court noted the evolution of the Supreme Court's first amendment
doctrines, the marked increase in the number of government employees since Mitchell,
and the context in which Mitchell was decided, a context of fear that political activity
would corrupt a neutral civil service. Id. at 576-77.
87 Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d 456, 472 (5th Cir. 1971). Hobbs held a Macon,
Georgia, ordinance that prohibited firemen and policemen from taking an active part in
electioneering unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Id. at 475.
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state interest .... It is this approach in Mitchell which we think
is no longer good law.88
The courts' evident confusion concerning Mitchell's continued validity
is well demonstrated in Northern Virginia Regional Park Authority v.
United States Civil Service Commission,8 9 a case in which the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals recently felt bound to apply Mitchell although it acknowledged the "considerable weight" of arguments that
tend to detract from the strength of that precedent.90
Letter Carriers
Letter Carriersis a class action brought by the National Association
of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, a union representing 200,000 postal
employees, and six federal employees 91 on behalf of all federal workers
and seeking a declaratory judgment that sections of the Hatch Act
are unconstitutional and an injunction to prevent enforcement of
the penalties prescribed for violation. The three-judge federal court"
did not grant standing to six Republican and Democratic committees
which sought to represent all state employees who are also governed
by the Hatch Act. 8
The majority opinion is based on the ambiguity inhering in the
Hatch Act's definition of proscribed behavior.9 4 The court does not
consider whether the statute is overbroad in restricting both voluntary
S8 Id.
89437 F.2d 1346 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 936. The court upheld the

Civil Service Commission's directive that monies be withheld from a federally funded
local agency on the ground that its director had violated the Hatch Act and the agency
had refused to dismiss him.
90 Id. at 1350. The court agreed with the appellants' contentions that Supreme Court
decisions subsequent to Mitchell established more rigorous constitutional standards and
cited several first amendment cases which reflect those standards. Id. at 1349.
91 Four of the federal employees are administrative workers and two are letter carriers. See note 6 supra. The Supreme Court might, therefore, distinguish between the
two types of employees represented and rule that prohibitions acceptable for one group
would be unacceptable for another. See text accompanying notes 52 and 53 supra.
92The three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2282, 2284 (1964).
The standards for convening a three-judge panel have been described by the Supreme
Court as follows:
When an application for a statutory three-judge court is addressed to a district
court, the court's inquiry is appropriately limited to determining whether the
constitutional question raised is substantial, whether the complaint at least formally alleges a basis for equitable relief, and whether the case presented otherwise comes within the requirements of the three-judge statute.
Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 715 (1962).
93 5 U.S.C. § 1502(a)(3) (1970) prohibits covered state employees from taking an active
part in political management and campaigns. None of the original plaintiffs were state
employees governed by the restrictions.
94 See note 5 supra.
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and coerced political action nor does it demand that the government
justify its infringement of first amendment rights by spelling out the
"dear and present danger"9 5 felt to be present in the absence of such
restrictions particularly with respect to industrial workers. The majority notes that the Hatch Act contains a qualifying provision which
guarantees an employee "the right to vote as he chooses and to express
his opinion on political subjects and candidates."0 6 This provision is
seen as contradicting the provision prohibiting active campaigning and
management: "one fixes the definition and the other makes the defini97
tion fluid."
Although the Civil Service Commission has not enforced the
dictates of many of the pre-1940 rulings, the federal employee is still
threatened by the broad incorporated definition and "will not know
when his words or acts relating to political subjects will offend."9 8
The court argues that Mitchell is outmoded and is inconsistent with
subsequent Supreme Court decisions. 99
Circuit Judge MacKinnon's dissenting opinion asserts Mitchell's
vitality and argues that the majority discussion on vagueness ignores
a Supreme Court policy of rejecting literal interpretations of disputed
statutes.100 Judge MacKinnon argues that Hatch did not "immutably
fix" the definition of prohibited political activity and cites a series of
Supreme Court decisions suggesting that all laws should receive sensible
(i.e., constitutional) constructions. 1' 1 However, none of the cited cases
deals with first amendment issues. The dissent sees the legislative history, not as incorporating the pre-1940 rulings, but as giving the Civil
Service Commission interpretive powers and including the earlier
decisions merely to impose a "ceiling on the Commission's.power to
95 In Cantwell, the Court said:
[I]n the absence of a statute narrowly drawn to define and punish specific conduct as constituting a clear and present danger to a substantial interest of the
State, the petitioner's communication, considered in the light of constitutional

guarantees, raises no such clear and present menace to public peace and order

310 V.. at 311.
96 5 U.S.C. § 7324(b) (1970).

97 346 F. Supp. at 581.
98 Id. at 582-83. For a discussion of the Commission's enforcement policies as a possible "administrative gloss" upon the Act, see notes 102-04 and accompanying text infra.
99 Heavy reliance -is placed on the Supreme Court decisions in Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Keyishian v.

Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York, 385 U.S. 589 (1967);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
100 346 F. Supp. at 590-91.
101 Id. at 590, citing, inter alia, Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S.
235, 250 (1970); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943); American
Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 293 (1907); Holy Trinity Church v. United

States, 143 U.S. 457, 461 (1892).
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restrict individual political activity."' 10 2 The definition by incorporation
is seen as a congressional limitation on the Civil Service Commission's
power to curtail political activity rather than as a standard in itself. 10 3
When viewed in this light, the dissent contends, the statute as interpreted by the courts and the Commission in the post-1940 era is
constitutional. 104
Moreover, as to the incorporated rulings, Judge MacKinnon suggests that Congress include only those decisions "which remain consistent with evolving concepts of individual freedom of political expression protected by the First Amendment, as announced by the
courts."10 5 This interesting theory of Judge MacKinnon thus suggests
that this (and other) statutes contain, as it were, self-adjusting mechanisms that update the legislation to concur with evolving interpretations of first amendment rights. If this theory were logically extended,
few statutes would ever require judicial review because those provisions
which are inconsistent with first amendment guidelines would automatically be deemed modified. If it is unnecessary for the courts to
review and strike down unconstitutional statutes, one wonders where
the evolving first amendment guidelines, by which statutes are to
self-adjust, are to come from.
Judge MacKinnon also finds notice of the statute's prohibitions to
be fair and ample, 10 reasoning that the availability of aids, such as the
Form 1236107 summary of prohibited activity, is relevant to the issue of
102 346 F. Supp. at 592.

103 It is difficult to accept this interpretation when one examines the statute's language which clearly incorporates the pre-1940 rulings as definition and the congressional
debate which evinced a clear intent not to grant the Commission power to define the
prohibited acts in the future. See note 29 supra.
104 346 F. Supp. at 593. The administrative interpretations of the Hatch Act, according to the dissent, have been consistent with first amendment guidelines. This, however,
should not be the standard by which the statute is examined as Congress never granted
the Commission the power to promulgate substantive rules which would define prohibited
activities. Congress explicitly limited the definition to the pre-1940 rulings. Although
courts may choose to give great weight to interpretative rulings of an administrative
agency which has not been given explicit authority to promulgate statutory regulations,
the courts are not bound by such interpretations. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
138 (1944).
The majority opinion rejects, on two grounds, the dissent's conclusion that the "administrative gloss" renders the statute constitutional. The majority contends that (1) the
Commission has no authority under the Hatch Act to define its terms and (2) even if
the Commission's post-1940 rulings be deemed an authorized "administrative gloss" on the
Act's terms, the only discernible standard promulgated by the Commission is still far
too vague to afford fair notice of its contents to government workers. 346 F. Supp. at
582-83.
105 346 F. Supp. at 594.
106 Id. at 598-99.
107 See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
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vagueness- that, in short, the existence of such summaries clarifies
the statute.108 Despite this latter finding, the dissenting opinion evinces
a basic uneasiness with the administration of the Hatch Act when it
notes that there is doubt as to whether the Commission's post-1940
interpretations have been explicit (presumably so as to overcome the
vagueness and overbreadth problems) or merely the result of prosecutorial discretion 0 9 The dissent would order the Civil Service
Commission to change any of its published interpretations of the
pre-1940 decisions which may not conform to evolving first amendment
doctrines as reflected in Supreme Court opinions."10 This suggested
order to review and change the statutory interpretations seems, at
the least, highly unusual in an opinion which affirms the constitutionality of the Act.
Critics of the Hatch Act point out that, today, upwards of three
million federal employees and as many as six million state employees,
15 per cent of the total working force, are denied full political participation."' In addition to quantitative reasons for questioning the scope
of the Hatch prohibitions, there is the qualitative argument that many
of these employees, by virtue of their experience, could make an important contribution to the discussion of public issues during election
campaigns.
It is clear that many employees are unfamiliar with acts prohibited
by the statute and undoubtedly restrict their participation in the
political processes more than called for by the statute. Highly relevant
to this question of whether there is a "chilling effect" on the exercise
of first amendment rights is a fairly recent survey of federal employees
which discovered widespread misunderstanding of the statute."12 Sixtyfour per cent of those responding gave incorrect answers to more than
five out of ten questions which inquired whether particular political
acts were prohibited." 3 The responses to the following three items
illustrate the misunderstanding: 14
108 346 F. Supp. at 596 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). Though it is clear that Congress
also looked to a summary of Commission interpretations of Rule I, congressional history
reveals considerable confusion as to the affect of the summary. See text accompanying
notes 32-35 supra.
109 546 F. Supp. at 599.
110 Id.
111 T. EmERsON, TnE SYsrEm OF FEDERA ExPESSION 563 (1970).
112 COMMIsSION ON PoLrmcAL Acrsvrr, supra note 18, at 20 (1967).
113 Id.
114 Although the Civil Service Commission has attempted to clarify some of the confusion engendered by the incorporated definition of active political management and
campaigning, even the Commission has revealed uncertainty in some areas. For a discussion of Commission uncertainty on the issue of whether an employee may write a
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Not
Prohibited prohibited
Can an employee make a speech
at a political rally? (prohibited) 15.8%
Can an employee put a political
bumpersticker on his car? (not
prohibited)
63.0%
Can an employee participate in
voter registration drives? (prohibited)
48.1%

[Vol. 47:509

Not sure

69.4%

14.6%

24.4%

12.5%

35.6%

16.0%

LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS

Alternatives to the present Hatch Act prohibitions do exist. A
Commission on Political Activities of Government Personnel was
established by Congress in 1966 to study the effects of the Hatch Act.
Chaired by Arthur Fleming, the Commission compiled information
and deliberated for one year, taking testimony from senators, congressmen, government officials and political scientists. Surveys of employee
reactions were also conducted." 5
The Commission recognized that the goals of encouraging citizen
participation in the political processes and assuring the integrity of
the administration of government are conflicting ones. Nevertheless,
it recommended modifications of Hatch Act restrictions to expand
permissible political activity. Specifically, the Commission favored
changes that would allow employees to freely express their political
views, that would spell out prohibitions in understandable terms, and
that would key the criteria for elective offices which employees are
permitted to hold to the nature of the office and not to a geographical
or constituency factor." 6 The Commission also proposed that the
administration of penalties be expedited, that voluntary contributions
to political organizations be considered, that employees be allowed to
serve as officers in political organizations and that, to ensure the voluntariness of permitted activities, an "office of employee's counsel" be
letter to a newspaper expressing his opinion concerning a partisan candidate, see Hearings
on S. 3374 and S. 3417 Before the Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess., at 212 (1972). Other areas of confusion are discussed in the Letter Carriers opinion. 341 F. Supp. at 581.
115 See text accompanying notes 112-113 supra.
116 The current act authorizes the Civil Service Commission to permit employees to
take part in partisan elections on behalf of independent candidates if the employees reside in communities where a majority of voters are also government employees. Sixty-three
localities, mostly in Virginia and Maryland, have been designated as excepted localities.
5 U.S.C. § 7327 (1970).
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established within the Civil Service Commission to receive complaints
of political coercion.
Another alternative approach to Hatch Act goals is the English
system in which restrictions on political activity by government employees is limited to specified categories of jobholders."1 Government
service, maintenance and industrial employees have the same political
rights as are enjoyed by citizens not on the government payroll.
Though techmical, clerical, lower professional and lower administrative
employees may not be candidates for national office, they may actively
participate in politics with the permission of their agencies. Executives
and senior civil servants are prohibited from political activity and must
resign their jobs if they wish to become candidates.11 s
Although there is much appeal to the English idea of permitting
certain categories of federal employees full participation in the political
process, it must be emphasized that the English were never confronted
with all the problems of the American civil service. The spoils system
in England never did more than reward friends, unlike its American
counterpart which put opposition party appointees out in order to
reward friends. 119 Consequently, English prohibitions had only one
goal: the smooth running of government machinery. American legisla20
tion, on the other hand, attempted to reform politics as well.1
If the Supreme Court does strike down the challenged provisions
of the Hatch Act, the public interest in preserving the integrity of
government functions will not be without safeguards while Congress
considers alternative legislation. It is well settled that the unconstitutionality of one section of a statute "does not necessarily defeat or
affect the validity of its remaining provisions."' 21 So long as the
remaining provisions of a statute are operative as law and it is clear
that the responsible legislative body would have intended them to
stand alone, they may stand. 22 The uncontroverted sections of the
Hatch Act afford safeguards in the areas of political contributions and
23
the use of authority to influence an election result.
117 See generally Epstein, supra

note 38, at 284.

118 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 20, §§ 1-15 (1957).
19 Epstein, supra note 38, at 282.
120 Id.
121 Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation
122 Id.
123 5 U.S.C. § 7321 (1970) authorizes

Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932).

the President to prescribe rules which protect
government employees from being penalized for refusing to contribute to a political fund
or perform political services.
5 U.S.C. § 7323 (1970) prohibits certain federal employees from receiving or giving
gifts for political purposes,
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Regardless of the outcome of the Court's review of Letter Carriers,
it is apparent that modification of the Hatch Act is inevitable. Bills
that would bring about significant change have already been introduced
in the Senate. 24 Senator Gale McGee (D. Wyo.), chairman of the
Senate Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, has indicated
that action by the 93rd Congress will depend on the Supreme Court
decision in Letter Carriers.125 Senator McGee, who characterizes the
district court majority opinion as "cogent and well-reasoned,"1 26 has
introduced legislation which removes most restrictions on political activity with the exception of those that apply to candidacy for elective
office.

1 27

Former Senate Bill 8417 (S. 235 in the 93rd Congress), introduced
by Senator Frank, Moss (D. Utah), would allow an employee to run
for a "local office." By "local office" is meant a position involving "a
subdivision of a state the duties of which require less than full-time
service and the compensation of which is nominal.'

128

The Moss bill

permits employees to actively campaign in elections involving national
partisan issues. Prohibitions are specifically spelled out as are penalties
and procedures for enforcement. The bill also maintains the prohibitions against an employee using his official position to influence or
interfere with the results of an election; soliciting and giving funds for
partisan purposes; and engaging in political activity while on duty.
House of Representatives Bill 914,129 introduced by former Representative Abner Mikva (D. Ill.), would permit all activity, including
candidacy for public office, except soliciting, giving, and receiving funds
or items of value for political purposes.
Employee union reaction to these proposals has been positive. 130
However, one area of disagreement centers on the consequences of
leaving a federal employment position to assume public office. It is
18 U.S.C. § 595 (1970) prohibits employees from using official authority to influence
elections.
18 U.S.C. § 600 (1970) forbids the promise of employment in consideration for any

political activity.
18 U.S.C. § 606 (1970) prohibits promotion of employees for agreeing to make political contributions.
24 S. 3374 and S. 3417, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). These bills have been reintroduced

in the 93d Congress as S. 350 and S. 235, respectively.
125 Letter from Senator Gale McGee to ST. JoHN's L. REv., Oct. 26, 1972.
126 Id.
127 S. 3374. See note 124 supra.
128 S. 3417 § 1602.
129 H.R. 914, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971). The status of this bill in the 93d Congress is
as yet undetermined.
180 See Hearings on S. 3374 and S. 3417 Before the Comm. on Post Office and Civil
Service, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
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clear that as long as employees are forced to sacrifice years of seniority
and accumulated benefits, few will be encouraged to exercise what
Senator McGee has termed "basic citizenship responsibility.' 131
Despite growing employee and congressional support, the Civil
Service Commission remains opposed to the changes embodied in the
proposed legislation. Civil Service Commission Chairman Robert
Hampton suggests that employee involvement in political campaigning
"would deal a crippling blow to merit principles"'1 because of the
favoritism that would ensue. Hampton does, however, favor clarification
of permitted and prohibited activity. The fears expressed by the
Civil Service Commission might be effectively overcome if an ombudsman-type office to which employees could report instances of political
coercion by other employees and supervisors were established. In addition to this "office of employee counsel,"'13 strict enforcement of
prohibitions against political coercion should be provided for.13 4
Although, in its present form, the Hatch Act is an affront to the
first amendment doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth, Congress
must seriously inquire, before adopting the concepts proposed by the
McGee-Moss bills, a more permissive Mikva-type bill, or complete
freedom for certain categories of workers, whether the type of political
environment that bred the spoils system exists today.135 This writer
feels that the influence of the spoils system of the 1880's and 1930's
which led to the severe restrictions under discussion has substantially
dissipated. The time is ripe to test the strength of the merit impact.
With proper safeguards, that experiment can succeed.

William Hibsher
1311d. at 1.
132

Id. at 51.

13 See text following note 116 supra.
134 See 1 REPORT, COMMMISSON ON POLITICAL Aenvrry OF GovERNmENT PERSONNE.

5

(1967).
135 See generally F. Mosmm,Dmiocmcy AN THE PuBLc SmEvcE (1968); P. VAN RiEa,
Hisroax OF U.S. CiviL SERvicE (1958).

